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Abstract 
 
Although the optimal policy under endogenous fertility has been widely studied, the optimal 
public intervention under endogenous childbearing age has remained largely unexplored. This 
paper examines the optimal family policy in a context where the number and the timing of births 
are chosen by individuals who differ as to how early fertility can weaken future earnings growth. 
We analyze the design of a policy of family allowances and of public pensions in such a setting, 
under distinct informational environments. We show how endogenous childbearing ages affect 
the optimal policy, through the redistribution across the earnings dimension and the 
internalization of fertility externalities. It is also shown that, contrary to common practice, 
children benefits differentiated according to the age of parents can, under some conditions, be part 
of the optimal family policy. 
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1 Introduction
As this is well-known among demographers, there has been a continuous post-
ponement of fertility in European economies since the late 1970s. That strong
demographic trend is well illustrated by the case of France. As shown on Figure
1, the average age at motherhood has raised from about 26.9 years in 1977 to
about 29.7 years in 2005.1 The postponement of fertility appears even more
strongly when we look at the mode of the distribution of the age at mother-
hood: the mode age has grown from 25 years in 1977 to 29 years today. With
the development of assisted reproductive technologies, that evolution is likely
to be sustained - if not reinforced - in the future.
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Figure 1: Age at motherhood in France
The causes of the postponement of fertility have been widely explored.2 Em-
pirical studies highlighted that womens earnings opportunities and educational
achievements are a major determinant of fertility behavior. The rise in womens
wage, by implying a higher opportunity cost of motherhood, appears to be a
major factor of fertility decline, which coincides also with later motherhood.3
Besides those empirical studies, theoretical models have also been devel-
oped to explain the choice of a particular fertility age-pattern over the lifecycle.
Those models, such as Happel et al. (1984), Cigno and Ermisch (1989) and
Cigno (1991), highlighted the central inuence of lifecycle e¤ects on the tim-
1Sources: INED (2011).
2See Gustafsson (2001) for a survey on the literature on childbearing age.
3Empirical studies include: Schultz (1985), Heckman and Walker (1990) and Tasiran (1995)
on Sweden, Ermisch and Ogawa (1994) on Japan, Merrigan and St Pierre (1998) on Canada,
and Joshi (2002) on Great Britain.
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ing of births. Whereas Happel et al. (1984) emphasized that the consumption
smoothing induced by the maximization of lifetime welfare may lead to delaying
births, Cigno and Ermisch (1989) focused on the shape of the earnings prole
induced by human capital investment, and argued that steeper earnings proles
lead to the postponement of births later in life.4
The various inuences of governments on the timing of births have also
been studied. While the income tax rate and parental leave benets reduce
the opportunity cost of early children, children allowances reduce the net di-
rect expenditures, and the income tax rate reduces also the forgone returns to
forgone human capital investment. Those inuences of governments have been
conrmed by various empirical studies.5 Macroeconometric studies, such as Er-
misch (1988) on UK and Walker (1995) on Sweden, identied a positive impact
of child allowances on early motherhood. That e¤ect was conrmed by micro-
econometric studies, such as Laroque and Salanié (2004) on France, who found
that cash benets increase the probability of having a rst child.
In the light of those inuences of the government on fertility behavior, a
natural question to raise concerns the optimal design of family policies. What
should government do in front of the postponement of fertility? Should govern-
ments implement a transfer policy in such a way as to reinforce (or weaken) that
demographic trend? Should governments subsidize births di¤erently depending
on the age of parents? By which channels are the optimal fertility policy and
the optimal pension policy related to each other?
The literature on the optimal policy under endogenous fertility has examined
various aspects of the problem, but without paying attention to the optimal
timing of births. Cigno (1986) showed that family allowances aimed at reducing
child poverty may, by raising fertility, have quite the opposite e¤ects, so that
the optimal policy may consist in taxing - instead of subsidizing - the number
of children.6 More recently, Cremer et al. (2006) studied the design of the
optimal pension system under endogenous and stochastic fertility, and showed
that, under positive fertility externalities, one should grant parents who have
more children with larger pension benets.7
The goal of this paper is to complement that literature, by examining the
design of the optimal public intervention in a context where not only fertility,
but, also, the childbearing age, are endogenous. For that purpose, we develop
a three-period model. In the rst two periods, individuals are active, and they
can have children. In the third period, individuals retire. In order to account
for the widely observed e¤ect of heterogeneity in education and in the timing of
births (Cigno and Ermisch 1989), we assume that some agents benet from a
rise in productivity and earnings (to an extent that is decreasing in the number
4Cigno and Ermisch (1989) also found, on the basis of UK data, empirical support for that
explanation of the observed heterogeneity in terms of fertility patterns.
5On this, see the survey by Gauthier (2007).
6This was conrmed by Balestrino et al. (2002) in a model where households di¤er in their
productivities and in their ability to raise children.
7That result is also obtained in Cremer et al. (2008), who examined the optimal pensions
scheme when fertility is endogenous and parents di¤er in their ability to raise children.
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of early children), whereas other agents do not benet from such a process,
and face a at earnings prole. In that framework, having a child in the rst
period relative to the second is cheaper, but it may impose a cost in terms of
educational and professional achievement, so that some trade-o¤ exists between
lower fertility cost and higher future wages. Moreover, when parents retire,
and count on some help from their children, they will, if earnings increase with
age, receive fewer resources per child under late childbearing than under early
childbearing. Retired agents will also benet from the contributions of fewer
individuals under late childbearing than under early childbearing (where they
benet from the contributions of their working children and grandchildren).
In the following, we made several simplifying assumptions. First, we abstract
here from intrafamily decision making issues, and treat a couple as a single indi-
vidual capable of working, saving and having children. Second, we assume away
the childhood period, i.e. the period during which children live as dependent of
their parents. Third, we focus on a static overlapping-generations model, and
do not explore here the e¤ects of childbearing ages on the long-run dynamics.8
Fourth, we assume here that the number of children is deterministic, and thus
rule out uncertainty about the number of children.9 Fifthly, we do not consider
investment in the quality of children, and the impact of birth spacing on this.10
Anticipating our results, we show that, under the laissez-faire, agents who
face at earnings prole tend to make children earlier than agents with an
increasing earnings prole. We characterize the rst-best utilitarian social opti-
mum, and show that this can be decentralized by means of lump sum transfers
from increasing-productivity agents to constant-productivity agents, in order
to equalize the consumption per period and the total number of children for
all agents (despite di¤erent timings for births). Then, we consider the second-
best optimal policy under linear taxation instruments, and show that the op-
timal family allowances are positive only if subsidizing children favours early
childbearing. The study of the second-best problem under non-linear instru-
ments shows that children allowances should concern children from constant-
productivity parents only. Finally, we examine the optimal family policy under
the presence of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension system, and show that the
social planner faces, under endogenous childbearing age, a trade-o¤ between
e¢ ciency (favouring late childbearing) and equity (helping early childbearing).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general
8Those e¤ects are discussed in the companion paper Pestieau and Ponthiere (2011). It is
shown there that, compared to the 2-period OLG model, the conditions for optimal capital
accumulation and optimal fertility di¤er quite a lot under varying childbearing ages. However,
Samuelsons (1975) Serendipity Theorem still holds in that broader demographic environment.
On the dynamics, see also DAlbis et al (2010) continuous-time OLG set up, where the total
fertility is decreasing in the age at motherhood.
9See Cigno and Luporini (2009) on the optimal family policy when the number and the
future earnings of children are random. The absence of risk rules out a case for early child-
bearing: the possibility to insure oneself against a total number of children lower than desired.
10On that issue, see Razin (1980) and Schultz (1997). Razin (1980) postulated that a longer
birth interval could be a good for the quality of children. Given that this paper does not focus
on education, we will not take that potential e¤ect into account here.
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framework. The rst-best utilitarian optimum is derived in Section 3, where its
decentralization is also examined. In Section 4, we look at the optimal child
benets when there is a perfect capital market. In Section 5, we introduce the
idea that pensions can be of the PAYG type, which may give an incentive to
both the government and individuals to have early children. Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic model
2.1 Environment
Whereas reproduction can, in reality, occur at various points in the lifetime,
we will focus here, for the sake of simplicity, on a three-period model with
two reproduction periods.11 The three life-periods are labeled a, ` and o (i.e.
advanced, late, old). In the rst two periods, individuals work, consume, save
and have children. It is assumed that a perfect capital market exists. In the last
period, individuals are retired and consume the proceeds of their savings.
To do justice to the observed heterogeneity in terms of education, career and
childbearing ages, we assume that individuals di¤er in the shape of the earnings
lifecycle prole. For simplicity, we consider the following two types:
 Type-1 agents have a constant productivity and earnings along the lifecy-
cle (periods 1 and 2);12
 Type-2 agents have, at period 2, a productivity that is larger than in
period 1, to an extent that is decreasing in the number of children they
had in period 1.
The lifetime welfare of an individual of type i 2 f1; 2g is expressed as:
Ui = u (ci) + u (di) + 
2u (bi) + v (nai + n`i) (1)
where ci, di and bi are consumption, u () is strictly concave,  is a time prefer-
ence factor (0    1) and v () is the utility for early and late children, which
is also strictly concave.13
In the rst period, consumption is equal to wage, w, minus saving and minus
the cost of raising children, naiea:14
ci = w   sai   naiea: (2)
11Adding more periods to the model would complicate the analysis, but without bringing
additional insights or results. Actually, our goal is to focus on the postponement of births, and
the existence of two reproduction periods su¢ ces to highlight the major trade-o¤s at work.
12 In some cases below, we allow type-1 agents to have a higher and endogenous productivity
in the second period, but always lower than that of type-2 agents.
13We assume here a perfect substituability, in welfare terms, between early and late children.
That assumption, which is made for simplicity, amounts to assume that children are not
durable consumption goods. As stressed in Gustafsson (2001), taking children as durable
goods would favour early childbearing ceteris paribus.
14For the sake of simplicity, we abstract here from the time cost of children, and only assume
a physical cost for each child. Note, however, that some additional costs, which could be called
"career" costs, are associated with early parenthood (see below).
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In the second period, an individual of type i 2 f1; 2g earns whi (nai), where
the function hi (nai)  1 8i accounts for the extra productivity and extra earn-
ings due to career advancement. We assume that those earnings gains are
larger for type-2 agents than for type-1 agents for any number of children, i.e.
limna2!1h2(na2) > h1(0). Moreover, we assume that earnings gains are de-
creasing in the number of early children: h0i (nai) < 0: This reects the idea that,
for some individuals with a broad career potential, early childbearing has a cost
on earning in period `. Indeed, various empirical studies, such as Joshi (1990,
1998) on Great Britain and Dankmeyer (1996) on the Netherlands, showed that
having children in an early stage of a career slows down human capital accumu-
lation and professional promotion.15
In the second period, the individual earns also savings income Rsai, where
R is the interest factor. He saves also s`i for the old age, and spends e`n`i as
cost of raising his n`i late children. Throughout this paper, we assume that the
direct cost of children is larger for late children than for early children:
e` > ea
That assumption is compatible with the medical literature showing the larger
costs of late motherhood in comparison to the ones under early motherhood.
Those additional costs are of various kinds, and concern both the mother and
the child (see Gilbert et al. 1999, Gustafsson 2001).16 We assume, for simplicity,
that the parents face the entire additional cost from late childbearing. Hence,
second-period consumption for an agent of type i 2 f1; 2g is:
di = whi (nai) +Rsai   s`i   n`ie`: (3)
In the third period, an agent of type i 2 f1; 2g consumes the proceeds of his
savings:
bi = Rs`i: (4)
2.2 Laissez-faire
Let us characterize the laissez-faire equilibrium, where each agent of type i 2
f1; 2g chooses rst-, second- and third-period consumptions (i.e. ci, di and bi),
as well as rst- and second-period children (i.e. nai and n`i) in such a way as
to maximize his lifetime welfare, subject to his budget constraint.
For an agent of type i 2 f1; 2g, the rst-order conditions are:
u0 (ci) = Ru0 (di) = 2R2u0 (bi)
 u0 (ci) ea + u0 (di)wh0i (nai) + v0 (nai + n`i) = 0
 u0 (di) e` + v0 (nai + n`i) = 0:
15Note that the precise causes of the negative e¤ect of early childbearing remain largely
unknown. For instance, Ermisch and Pevalin (2005) showed that very early motherhood (teen
births) worsens later outcomes on the marriage market.
16According to Gustafsson (2001), late births imply, on average, more pregnancy complica-
tions, more ceasareans and more breast cancer for mothers. Moreover, late children are also
more subject to somatic and learning problems.
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The rst equalities, which describe the optimal consumption prole, are
quite standard. However, the second and third conditions, which characterize
the optimal early and late number of children, are not straightforward.
To interpret those conditions, let us consider the case where h1 (na1) = 1 and
assume further that  = R = 1: Then we have, at the laissez-faire equilibrium,
a perfect consumption smoothing for all agents:
ci = di = bi
with higher consumption levels for type-2 agents, who benet from an increasing
earnings prole.
We also have that type-1 agents have no children in the second period:
n`1 = 0
Actually, given that late children are more costly than early children under
e` > ea, and given that their productivity will remain the same whatever the
number of early children is, type-1 agents have no reason to postpone fertility.
The number of early children for type-1 agents is given by:
u0 (c1) ea = v0 (na1)
The number of early children should be at a level where the marginal welfare
cost from early fertility (the LHS) is exactly equal to the marginal welfare gain
from early fertility (the RHS).
Regarding agents of type-2, three possible cases can arise, depending on the
size of the cost di¤erential between early and late children, and on the impact
of early parenthood on future productivity. The three cases are: (1) na2 > 0
and n`2 > 0; (2) na2 = 0 and n`2 > 0; (3) na2 > 0 and n`2 = 0.
 If there exist some na2 > 0 and n`2 > 0 such that
 u0 (c2) ea + u0 (d2)wh02 (na2) + v0 (na2 + n`2) = 0
 u0 (d2) e` + v0 (na2 + n`2) = 0
then we have an interior solution for fertility in the two ages.17 Simplifying
those two conditions, we obtain:
e`   ea =  wh02 (na2)
Hence the marginal gain from early childbearing (the LHS), i.e. lower
children costs, equals the marginal loss from early children (the RHS).
 Alternatively, when we have, for any na2 > 0, the strict inequality:
e`   ea <  wh02 (na2)
17Obviously, given ea < e`, those two FOCs would not be all valid if h02 (na2) = 0.
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then the marginal gain from early childbearing is necessarily inferior to
the marginal loss from early children, so that the optimal number of early
children is a corner solution, i.e. na2 = 0. In that case, n`2 is given by:
u0 (d2) e` = v0 (n`2)
That conditions equalizes the marginal loss from late childbearing (the
LHS) with the marginal gain from late childbearing (the RHS). Hence, in
that case, we have na2 = 0 and n`2 > 0.
 Finally, when we have, for any na2 > 0, the strict inequality:
e`   ea >  wh02 (na2)
then the marginal gain from early childbearing is necessarily superior to
the marginal loss from early children, so that the optimal number of late
children is a corner solution, i.e. n`2 = 0. Then, na2 is given by:
 u0 (c2) ea + u0 (d2)wh02 (na2) + v0 (na2) = 0
Hence, in that case, we have na2 > 0 and n`2 = 0.
Regarding the total number of children, the number of early children for
type-1 agents is given by:
u0 (c1) ea = v0 (na1)
whereas, under na2 > 0 and n`2 > 0, we have
u0 (c2) ea   u0 (d2)wh02 (na2) = v0 (na2 + n`2)
If jh02 (na2)j is su¢ ciently large, type-2 agents have fewer children than type-1
agents: na2 + n`2 < na1.
When na2 = 0, the optimal number of late children n`2 is given:
u0 (d2) e` = v0 (n`2)
With a strongly concave u(), it must be the case that n`2 < na1.
Finally, when n`2 = 0, the optimal number of early children na2 satises:
u0 (c2) ea   u0 (d2)wh02 (na2) = v0 (na2)
Here again, if jh02 (na2)j is large, we have, despite c2 > c1, that na2 < na1.
In sum, whereas type-1 agents do not have late children, but only early
children, three possible cases can arise for type-2 agents. If the cost di¤erential
between late and early parenthood is extremely large, as it used to be the case
before the massive development of assisted reproductive technologies, then type-
2 agents also opt for early children only. If, on the contrary, the cost di¤erential
between late and early is low, then type-2 agents have no early children, and only
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late children, since this will preserve their future productivity at little additional
child costs. In the intermediate case, there is an interior solution with na2 > 0
and n`2 > 0, with a shape of fertility prole that depends on how sensitive the
earnings prole is to early parenthood. Finally, the total number of children for
type-1 agents tends to exceed the number of children for type-2 agents when
the earnings prole of the latter is strongly sensitive to early births.
Therefore, although simple, the model developed in this section can explain
the observed postponement of fertility as a result of the development of assisted
reproductive technologies, which reduced the gap e`   ea. Our model allows
us also to rationalize the observed heterogeneity: in conformity with empirical
studies (Cigno and Ermisch 1989, Ermisch and Ogawa 1995, Joshi 2002), adults
with lower career opportunities tend to make children earlier than adults with
(potentially) steeper earnings proles. Finally, our framework can also, under
general conditions, explain why the tendency towards steeper potential earnings
proles over time tends to reduce total fertility.
3 The rst-best problem
Let us now characterize the social optimum of our economy. For that purpose,
we will focus on a classical utilitarian social objective, whose goal coincides with
the maximization of aggregate welfare. We also focus here on the aggregate
welfare of a single cohort of individuals, which includes a xed fraction 1 of
agents of type 1, and a xed fraction 2 of agents of type 2. Whereas focusing
on a single cohort of given size is an obvious simplication, this allows us to
escape from well-known di¢ culties raised by population ethics.18
The utilitarian rst-best optimum is obtained by maximizing the following
Lagrangian:X
i (Ui    [ci + di + bi + naiea + n`ie`   w (1 + hi (nai))])
where  denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint
of the economy.
Assuming interior solutions, we obtain the following conditions:
u0 (ci) = u0 (di) = u0 (bi) = 
v0 (nai + n`i) =  [ea   wh0i (nai)]
v0 (nai + n`i) = e`
The utilitarian social optimum involves an equalization of all consumptions
across individuals of all types, and across periods. Thus, whatever agents have
an increasing productivity prole (i.e. type-2 agents) or a at productivity
prole (i.e. type-1 agents), they should all enjoy the same consumptions at all
periods of their life.
18On this, see Blackorby et al. (2005).
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Regarding optimal fertility, we have, for type-1 agents, that the FOCs for na1
and n`1 cannot be both satised. Given e` > ea, the social optimum involves,
as in the laissez-faire, na1 > 0 and n`1 = 0, that is, it is not socially optimal
that type-1 agents have late children. As far as type-2 agents are concerned,
three cases can arise, like at the laissez-faire.
If there exists some na2 > 0 such that:
e`   ea =  wh02 (na2)
then the FOCs for na2 and n`2 can be simultaneously valid. As a consequence,
we have: na2 > 0 and n`2 > 0 at the social optimum.
On the contrary, if, for any na2 > 0, we have
e`   ea <  wh02 (na2)
then we have na2 = 0 and n`2 > 0 at the social optimum.
Finally, if, for any na2 > 0, we have
e`   ea >  wh02 (na2)
then we have na2 > 0 and n`2 = 0 at the social optimum.
Regarding the total number of children, we have, for agents of types 1:
v0 (na1) = ea
whereas, type-2 agentss fertility satises one of the following conditions:
v0 (na2 + n`2) = e` if n`2 > 0
v0 (na2) =  [ea   wh02 (na2)] if n`2 = 0
Thus, provided the optimal number of late children for type-2 agents is
positive, we obtain, given e` > ea, that the optimal number of children for
type-2 agents is lower than the optimal number of children for type-1 agents:
na1 > na2 + n`2
The same result holds if the optimal number of late children for type-2
agents is zero. Indeed, in that case, we obtain, given wh02 (na2) < 0, that the
optimal number of children for type-2 agents is lower than the optimal number
of children for type-1 agents:
na1 > na2
Thus utilitarianism recommends the equalization of consumptions across in-
dividuals and time periods, as well as a larger total fertility for type-1 agents
than for type-2 agents. The social optimum involves only early children for
type-1 agents, and possibly early and/or late children for type-2 agents, de-
pending on the cost gap between late and early children, and on the sensitivity
of productivity to early parenthood.
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Hence, the utilitarian social optimum di¤ers signicantly from the laissez-
faire. Whereas type-1 agents have lower consumptions, and may even have
fewer children than type-2 agents at the laissez-faire, the utilitarian optimum
recommends the same consumptions for all agents, as well as more children for
type-1 agents than for type-2 agents.
Regarding the decentralization of the social optimum, this can be achieved
by means of lump-sum transfers from type-2 agents towards type-1 agents, in
such a way as to equalize all consumptions. Note that such transfers, by reducing
the marginal utility of consumption for type-1 agents, will raise early fertility
na1 above its laissez-faire level. Inversely, by increasing the marginal utility of
consumption for type-2 agents, those transfers will tend to reduce the fertility
of type-2 agents, but without a¤ecting the timing of births.19
4 Family allowances
The previous section showed how the rst-best optimum can be decentralized
by means of lump sum transfers from individuals with high earnings potential
towards individuals with low earnings potential. However, such an intervention
requires both that lump sum transfers are available policy instruments, and
that the government can observe the types of individuals. These are strong
assumptions. In this section, we depart from such a rst-best problem, and
consider instead the characterization of the second-best social optimum.
For that purpose, we will proceed in two stages. We will rst focus on the
optimal policy when the only available scal instruments are uniform payroll
taxes, demogrants and children allowances. Then, we will consider the optimal
policy under asymmetric information, under non-linear scal instruments.
4.1 Linear case
The government has, as available policy instruments, a uniform payroll tax,  ,
a uniform demogrant, T , and a uniform subsidy on the number of children, .
The instrument  can be understood as a family allowance.
We assume, as above, that the two types of agents di¤er regarding the slope
of their (potential) earning prole: h2(na2) > h1(na1)  1 8na1; na2  0,
with h0i(nai) < 0. However, given that we are here mainly concerned with the
timing of fertility rather than with the total fertility, we assume that, for each
individual, the total fertility is xed to its replacement level, i.e. nai + n`i = 1.
To simplify notations, we denote early fertility nai by ni = 1   n`i, and we
normalize the utility from children, in such a way that v (1) = 0.
In the laissez-faire, each agent of type i 2 f1; 2g maximizes:
Ui = ui (ci) + u (di) + u (bi)   [ci + di + bi   T   (1  )
w (1 + hi (ni)) + (1  ) ((ea   e`)ni + e`)] :
19The conditions describing the type of optimum (interior or corner) are independent from
consumption levels, and depend only on ea, e` and h02().
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where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the agents budget constraint.
The FOCs are:
u0i (ci) = u
0 (di) = u0 (bi) = 
  (1  )wh0i (ni) + (1  ) (ea   e`) = 0
Thus agents tend, here again, to smooth consumption across periods, and orga-
nize the timing of births in such a way as to equalize the marginal welfare losses
and marginal welfare gains from early parenthood.
As to the government, its objective is to maximize the sum of individual
utilities subject to its revenue constraint. Namely, it maximizes the following
Lagrangian:
L =
X
i

3u

(1  )w (1 + hi (ni)) + T   (1  ) ((ea   e`)ni + e`)
3

+ [w (1 + hi (ni))  T    (ea   e`)ni + e`]g
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the revenue constraint.
Using the envelope theorem, we obtain the following FOCs:20
@L
@
=
 Pi [u0 (xi)w (1 + hi (ni))  w (1 + hi (ni))
 wh0i (ni) @ni@    (ea   e`) @ni@
 = 0
@L
@
=
P
i

u0 (xi) [(ea   e`)ni + e`] + wh0i (ni) @ni@
  (ea   e`) @ni@    [(ea   e`)ni + e`]
 = 0
@L
@T
=
P
i

u0 (xi)   (1 + ) (ea   e`) @ni@T
+wh0i (ni)
@ni
@T
 = 0
where xi  (1 )w(1+hi(ni))+T (1 )((ea e`)ni+e`)3 is the argument of the agent
is temporal utility u().
Those conditions characterize the optimal values for our instruments  , 
and T . Note, however, that the simultaneous study of the optimal levels of the
three taxation tools would be quite laborious, as their values are related to each
others through the governments budget constraint. Hence, to keep the analysis
simple, we will proceed as follows. To interpret those optimality conditions,
we will consider alternative pairs of instruments, holding the other instrument
equal to 0. Hence, we will focus on the pairs ( ; T ) and (; T ), while keeping,
each time, the other scal tool set to 0. This will allow us to derive, in ne,
closed-form solutions for the optimal levels of instruments.
Let us start with the pair ( ; T ), composed of a payroll tax on labor earnings
and a rst-period demogrant. The rst FOC from above does not su¢ ce, on its
own, to characterize the optimal level of  , as a rise in  must, under the gov-
ernments budget constraint, imply a change in the demogrant T , in such a way
as to maintain the budget equilibrium. Therefore, in order to characterize the
optimal  , we will use a compensated Lagrangian expression, whose derivative
20For simplicity we assume interior solutions, which excludes the case where h1 = 1.
12
with respect to the policy instrument  gives us the e¤ect of a variation of 
on the Lagrangian when that change is compensated by a variation of T that
keeps the governments budget equilibrium. Using the optimality conditions,
the derivative of the compensated Lagrangian can be dened as:
@ ~L
@
 @L
@
+
@L
@T
@T
@
=
@L
@
+
@L
@T
E [w (1 + h (n))]
where ~L denotes the compensated Lagrangian, and where the second term of
the RHS accounts for the e¤ect of a change in the tax rate  on the rst-period
demogrant T , under the governments budget equilibrium constraint. The op-
erator E() denotes the average value of its argument among the population.
Substituting for the FOCs for optimal  and T and equalizing to zero yields:
@ ~L
@
=
@L
@
+
@L
@T
E [w (1 + h (n))]
=  E [u0 (x)w (1 + h (n))] + E [u0 (x)w]E [(1 + h (n))]  E

A
@~n
@

= 0
where A  wh0 (n)+ (e`   ea) is the e¤ect of n on the revenue constraint (the
rst term is negative and the second positive) and @~n@  @n@ + @n@T @T@ denotes
the e¤ect of a change in  on early fertility, when that change is compensated
by a change in T so as to maintain the budget equilibrium.
Regarding the pair (; T ), one can proceed in the same way as with the pair
( ; T ), and dene the derivative of the compensated Lagrangian as follows:
@ ~L
@
 @L
@
+
@L
@T
@T
@
=
@L
@
  @L
@T
[(ea   e`)E (n)  e`]
where the second term is the e¤ect of a change in  on the demogrant, under
the governments budget equilibrium.
Substituting for the FOCs for optimal  and T and equalizing to zero yields:
@ ~L
@
=
@L
@
  @L
@T
[(ea   e`)E (n)  e`]
= (ea   e`) [E (u0 (x)n)  E (u0 (x))E (n)] + E

A
@~n
@

= 0
where @~n@  @n@ + @n@T @T@ denotes the e¤ect of a change in  on early fertility
when that change is compensated by a change in T in such a way as to maintain
the budget equilibrium.
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The two compensated Lagrangian conditions can be rewritten as:
 cov (u0 (x) ; (1 + h (n)))  E

A
@~n
@

= 0
cov (u0 (x) ; n) (ea   e`) + E

A
@~n
@

= 0
To interpret these tax formulae, we look at pairs of instruments :  and T and
 and T . Then, we obtain the following expressions for the optimal payroll tax
and the optimal child subsidy:
 =
 cov (u0 (x) ; w (1 + h (n)))
E

@~n
@
h0 (n)
 (5)
 =
cov (u0 (x) ; n)
E

@~n
@
 (6)
Regarding the optimal payroll tax, note rst that the numerator of (5) is
positive, as the covariance is negative, the correlation between x and h (n) being
positive, given h0 (n) < 0: This is the standard equity term of the tax formula.
However, the sign of  depends also on that of the denominator, whose sign
depends on the one of  @~n=@: If the (aggregate) compensated e¤ect of the tax
on n is negative, then the tax is desirable. This is the e¢ ciency term of the tax
formula. On the contrary, if the (aggregate) compensated e¤ect of  on n is
positive, the denominator is negative, implying a negative optimal  .
As far as optimal family allowances are concerned, the numerator of (6) is
positive (low income agents have early children). The equity term of the scal
formula pushes towards the subsidization of children. We thus have positive
child benets if the denominator is also positive, that is, if those children benets
have a positive (aggregate) e¤ect on early childbearing in compensated terms.
In sum, the optimal policy consists, in the absence of lump sum transfers, into
a subsidization of children, to the extent that such family allowances increase
early parenthood. However, if subsidizing children reduces early parenthood,
then family allowances are no longer justied, and a taxation of children is
required instead. The intuition is the following. If subsidizing children fosters
early parenthood, this means, given that early parenthood concerns generally
the individuals with low career opportunities, that family allowances are a way
to redistribute resources in the right direction (i.e. individuals with low career
opportunities), by subsidizing a good that those agents consume more than
others. Inversely, if subsidizing children reduces early parenthood and raises late
parenthood, family allowances are regressive, since these amount to subsidize a
good that is mostly consumed by individuals with high career opportunities.
Finally, note that, as an alternative to this presentation, we could replace the
general children subsidy  by a subsidy a on early childbearing only.21 Under
21 In that case, there is no tax nor subsidy on late childbearing.
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such a rened instrument, children would be subsidized di¤erently, according to
the age of their parents. In that case, the optimal child allowance would be:
a =
cov (u0 (x) ; n)
E
@~n
@a
where @~n=@a is the e¤ect, on early fertility, of a change in a compensated
by a change in T in such a way as to maintain the budget equilibrium. The
compensated e¤ect @~n=@a is positive, leading to a subsidy on early children.
Hence, the availability of children allowances di¤erentiated according to the
age of parents would be an indirect way to redistribute resources towards agents
with low career opportunities, who are usually the ones who have early children.
4.2 Non linear case: 2 types
Let us now turn to an alternative formulation of the second-best problem, where
the available scal instruments are not restricted to linear (uniform) instru-
ments, but where the government cannot observe the types of agents. Here
again, we assume, as above, a perfect capital market with zero rate of interest
and no time preference.
The problem for an individual of type i is to maximize:
u (ci) + u (di) + u (bi)   [ci + di + bi   w (1 + hi (ni)) + ni (ea   e`) + e`]:
This implies ci = di = bi, so that the utility can be reduced to
' [w (1 + hi (ni))  ni (ea   e`)  e` + Ti]
where ' () denotes the agents lifetime welfare ('0() > 0, '00() < 0), whereas
Ti denotes a lump sum transfer such that
P
iTi = 0:
The central planner cannot observe the types of agents. We assume that
h2 (n) > h1 (n) > 1 with h0i (n) < 0: If the di¤erence between h2 and h1 is big
enough, type-1 agents will choose a very high value of n1, and type-2 agents will
postpone childbearing. In the rst-best, there will be some redistribution from
type 2 to type 1, namely T1 > 0 > T2:
In the second-best, the central planner cannot observe the types of agents.
Hence, it is tempting, for an agent of type 2, that is, with high career oppor-
tunities, to pretend to be of type 1, in such a way as to benet from public
transfers. Therefore, the social planner must make sure that type-2 agents do
not mimic type-1 agents. This leads us to the self-selection constraint:
' [w (1 + h2 (n2)) + n2 (e`   ea)  e` + T2] >
' [w (1 + h2 (n1)) + n1 (e`   ea)  e` + T1] : (7)
It is clear that, if we had assumed h1 (n1) = 1 implying n1 = 1; then
T1 = 2 (wh2 (n2) + n2 (ea   e`))
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which is the rst-best solution.
Formally, the second-best problem can be written by means of the La-
grangian:
L =
X
i f' (w (1 + hi (ni)) + ni (e`   ea)  e` + Ti)  Tig
+

' (w (1 + h2 (n2)) + n2 (e`   ea)  e` + T2)
 ' (w (1 + h2 (n1)) + n1 (e`   ea)  e` + T1)

where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint on lump sum
transfers, whereas  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the self-selection
constraint.
The FOCs are:
- n1 : 1'0 (x1) [wh01 (n1) + (e`   ea)]  '0 (x2) [wh02 (n1) + (e`   ea)] = 0
- n2 : ['0 (x2)2 + ] [wh02 (n2) + (e`   ea)] = 0
- T1 : 1 ('0 (x1)  )  '0 (x2) = 0
- T2 : 2 ('0 (x2)  ) + '0 (x2) = 0
First of all, we see that, when the self-selection constraint is not binding
( = 0), we have the rst-best outcome:
e`   ea =  wh0i (ni)
'0 (xi) = 
On the contrary, when  > 0, we have:
e`   ea =  wh02 (n2)
'0 (x1) >  > '0 (x2)
In other words, in the choice of n2, one has the standard "non distortion at the
top" result. As to redistribution, it is only partial, since we have: x2 > x1. Thus,
the presence of asymmetric information prevents the equalization of lifetime
welfare across types, unlike in the rst-best optimum. Finally, we have
wh01 + (e`   ea) = 
'0 (~x2)
'0 (x1)1
[wh02 (n1) + (e`   ea)] :
This expression means that one should have a subsidy on n1 to relax the self-
selection constraint. Indeed, given that early children are more important for
agents of type 1 in comparison to agents of type 2 (for whom early childbearing
has worse e¤ects on the earnings prole), a simple way to prevent type-2 agents
from pretending to be of type 1 to get transfers consists of subsidizing children.
In sum, the optimal policy under asymmetric information involves children
allowances that are di¤erentiated according to the parents(potential) earnings
proles. Whereas early children from parents with (potentially) steep earnings
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proles are not subsidized, early children from parents with at earnings prole
should be subsidized, as a way to solve the self-selection problem. Thus, even if
the government cannot observe the type of agents, it can nonetheless insure the
self-selection of types by proposing di¤erent children allowances, which make,
by construction, any mimicking suboptimal for individuals.
5 Childbearing and PAYG social security
Up to now, we studied the optimal family policy under a perfect capital market.
We will now relax that assumption. For that purpose, we will assume that the
only way individuals can provide resources for their old age is through a contract
such that when retired they get a fraction of their childrens earnings.
Such a contract can take various forms. It can be a standard Pay-As-You-
Go pension system (PAYG), which provides a pension to the elderly thanks to
the contributions of the young active individuals. It can also take the form of
intergenerational trade within the (extended) family, each active child giving
some fraction of his income to the inactive elderly in his family. Moreover, the
system can be an individualized system, where parents internalize the e¤ect
of their fertility choices on retirement benets, or, alternatively, a collective
system, where parents can free-ride on the system (either PAYG or familial), to
get large pensions without supporting the cost of fertility.
As we shall see, relaxing the perfect capital market assumption and replacing
it by a pension system is not neutral at all for the design of the optimal family
allowances in the context of endogenous childbearing ages. The reason is that,
once a (formal or informal) pension system is introduced, there might be, for
parents, an incentive in having early children. The reasons are twofold. First,
children, if born a longer time ago, can, under increasing earnings proles,
provide higher pensions to their parents. Second, and more importantly, when
parents with early children are retired, they can count not on one, but on two
generations of workers: their own children and their grandchildren.
To illustrate this, we will rst, for the sake of presentation, study fertility
choices under an individualized pension system, when there is only one type of
agents. We will then reintroduce heterogeneity later on in this section.
5.1 Laissez-faire and optimal policy with one type
In that context, the problem faced by an individual amounts to choosing savings
sa, early children na, late children n` and contribution rate  to maximize:22
U = u [(1  )w   eana   sa] + u [(1  )wh (na)  e`n` + sa]
+u [ (wn` + wh (na)na + wnana)] + v (na + n`)
where  is the fraction of earnings that is paid to the elderly, while na means
that the individual expects his early children to have made the same number of
22To keep things simple, we assume that savings between the rst and the second periods
is possible.
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early children as he made himself (i.e. na), without having any control on it.
Note that the earningsbasis available for the funding of the elderlys pensions
includes three terms: the rst two terms (i.e. wn` and wh (na)na) concern
the incomes from the late and the early children, whereas the third term, i.e.
wnana, concerns the income of grandchildren, whose number is nana (as each
of the na early child had also na early children once adult).
We can thus obtain the following FOCs:
sa : u
0 (c) = u0 (d) (8)
 : u0 (c) = u0 (b)
n` + h (na)na + nana
1 + h (na)
(9)
n` : u
0 (c) e` = u0 (b) w + v0 (na + n`) (10)
na : u
0 (c) [ea + (1  )wh0 (na)] = u0 (b)  (wh (na) + wna) + v0 (na + n`)(11)
In a world of identical individuals, these 4 conditions lead to the optimal
decision concerning sa; na; n` and  as long as each individual considers that the
pension scheme operates at the level of the family. It is interesting to observe
that such a PAYG scheme creates a distortion in favor of early childbearing,
relative to a setting of a fully funded pension system. The reason is that early
children have higher earnings when their parents retire, and that they have
themselves some working children, unlike the parentslate children.
If, instead of that individualized pension system, the PAYG scheme were
collective, each agent would not, when making his fertility choices, perceive his
impact on pension benets. Hence, agents would choose a lower level of fertility.
To see this, note that, under collective pensions, conditions (8) and (9) would
be unchanged, but conditions (10) and (11) would become:
u0 (c) e` = v0 (na + n`) (10)
u0 (c) [ea + (1  )wh0 (na)] = v0 (na + n`) (11)
Given that the RHS of (10) includes an additional positive term in comparison
to (10), agents tend to make, under a collective pensions system, fewer late
children n` than under an individualized system. Similarly, the RHS of (11) in-
cludes an additional positive term absent in (11), so that the collective pensions
system induces fewer early children than under individualized pensions.
Therefore, in order to induce the optimal fertility behavior under a collective
system, one would need Pigouvian subsidies a and ` on early and late children,
such that
a = w (h (na) + na)
u0 (b)
u0 (c)
` = w
u0 (b)
u0 (c)
This is a standard problem with PAYG and fertility (see Gahavari 2009): in-
dividuals do not internalize the e¤ect that their fertility choice can have on
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pension benets. We have the following inequality between Pigouvian subsidies:
a > `
The children subsidy should be higher on early than on late childbearing, even
though one can have n` > na: There are two reasons why the external e¤ects of
early fertility exceed the ones of late fertility. First, under h (na) > 1, the levels
of earnings of contributors born from young parents are larger than the earnings
of contributors born from older parents, since only the former can benet from
increasing productivity. Second, the number of contributors is strongly a¤ected
by early fertility decisions, through the number of grandchildren. On the con-
trary, in the case of late parenthood, grandchildren cannot fund the pension
system, and so the fertility externality is less sizeable.
Those arguments tend to justify a di¤erentiated scal treatment of early
and late parenthoods, under the form of children allowances that depend on
the age of parents. Thus, even if one assumes a perfect homogeneity of the
population in terms of career opportunity and earnings prole, there is already
a strong argument not only for subsidizing children, but also for subsidizing
them di¤erently depending on the age of their parents. The justication is
that fertility externalities induced by early and late fertility are not of the same
magnitudes, inviting distinct Pigouvian subsidies.
5.2 Laissez-faire and optimal policy under two types
Whereas the above policy analysis was carried out for a unique type of agents,
let us now turn back to the case when individuals di¤er in their future career
and earnings opportunities (i.e. the future earnings function hi(nai)). For that
purpose, we assume, here again, h2(na2) > h1(na1)  1, with h0i(nai) < 0. For
simplicity of presentation, we suppose also that nai = ni = 1   n`i, and that
v (1) = 0: We also assume saving between rst and second period.
Given that children allowances di¤erentiated according to the age of parents
have been already studied above, we will abstract here from these, and assume
that the available scal instruments are: a uniform child benet of rate , a
payroll tax  and at rate PAYG pension p. Given those assumptions, we have:
ci = di
and thus
Ui = 2u

(1  )w (1 + hi (ni))  (1  ) (ni (ea   e`)  e`)
2

+ u (p) :
We also have:
p =
X
i

w
 
1  ni + hi (ni)ni + n2i
   (eani + e` (1  ni)) :
Each individual i 2 f1; 2g chooses ni without seeing the e¤ect his choice has on
his future pension benets. His choice of ni is determined by the FOC:
u0 (ci) [w (1  )h0i (ni)  (1  ) (ea   e`)] = 0:
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That condition does not yield the socially optimal level of early children, since
this neglects the impact of early fertility on old-age pensions through its impact
on the budget constraint of the economy.
To see this, let us now turn to the social planners problem. We can rewrite
it by means of the following Lagrangian:
L =
X
i

Ui   

p+  (eani + e` (1  ni))  w
 
1  ni + hi (ni)ni + n2i
	
:
where  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the governments budget
constraint.
Using again the operator E to lighten the presentation, we have the FOCs:
@L
@p
= E [u0 (p)  ] = 0
@L
@
=  E (u0 (c)w (1 + h (n))) + E  w  1  n+ h (n)n+ n2  E B@n
@

= 0
@L
@
= E [u0 (c) [n (ea   e`)  e`]]  E ((ean+ e` (1 + n)))  E

B
@n
@

= 0
where B   (ea   e`)   w ( 1 + h (n) + nh0 (n) + 2n) denotes the e¤ect of n
on the budget constraint. A marginal increase in early fertility n has 4 revenue
e¤ects: (1) a revenue increase thanks to lower child cost (i.e. as ea < e`);
(2) a revenue loss as h0 (n) < 0 (due to the productivity loss induced by early
childbearing); (3) another revenue gain as h > 1 (thanks to the larger contribu-
tions of the children once older and more productive); (4) and another revenue
gain through grandchildren (which is linear in the number of early children). A
su¢ cient condition for B < 0 is:  nh0(n)h < 1 + 2n 1h .
Those FOCs can be rewritten as:
@L
@
=  cov (u0 (x) ; 1 + h) + E [u0 (p)  v0 (x)]E (1 + h)
+u0 (p)E
 
1  n+ h (n)n+ n2  E (u0 (p))
w
E

B
@n
@

@L
@
= (ea   e`) cov [u0 (x)]  E (u0 (b)  u0 (x))E (n)
 E (u0 (b))E

B
@n
@

:
To better interpret these expressions, let us consider the case where only pairs
of scal instruments are available: on the one hand, the pair ( ; p), that is, only
a tax rate and a pension are available instruments; on the other hand, the pair
(; p), that is, only a child allowance and a pension are available instruments.
Let us rst consider the pair ( ; p),  being xed to 0. Equalizing the above
FOCs to 0 and isolating  yields:
 =
 cov(u0(x);1+h)+E(u0(p) u0(c))E(1+h)+u0(p)E(1 n+h(n)+n2)
E(u0(p))
w E(
@n
@ ( 1+nh0+h+2n))
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That formula denes the optimal level of the payroll tax  when the scal
revenues are used to fund a pension system only. The numerator consists of 3
terms that are all expected to be positive (assuming that E (u0 (p)  u0 (c)) > 0).
Hence those three terms push toward more redistribution through the income
tax. The denominator gives the e¤ect of the tax on public revenue. The sign of
this e¢ ciency e¤ect depends on the impact of earnings taxation on aggregate
early fertility (i.e. E (@n=@)), and on the impact of aggregate early fertility on
the governments budget constraint. If the impact of  on the aggregate early
fertility is negative (i.e. E (@n=@) < 0), and if the impact of early fertility on
scal revenues is also negative, (i.e. if nh
0(n)
h <  1  2n 1h ), the e¢ ciency e¤ect
is also positive. As a consequence, the optimal tax is positive:  > 0.
Turning now to the pair (; p), under the assumption  = 0. Equalizing the
above FOCs to 0 and isolating  yields:
 =
(e`   ea) cov (u0 (x) ; n)  E (u0 (p)  u0 (c))
(e`   ea)Eu0 (p)E@n
@
:
Assume that the poor (low hi) tend to have more early children than the rich
(i.e. dn=dh < 0). Assume further that child allowances have a positive e¤ect
on (total) early fertility (i.e. E (@n=@) > 0). Then the sign of the optimal
child allowance rate  depends on the relative strength of the two terms of
the numerator. On the one hand, the positive covariance term pushes for a
positive  and a low pension. Indeed, if the poor tend to make more children,
the equity term pushes towards the subsidization of children, i.e.  > 0. That
e¤ect is increasing in the cost di¤erential between late and early childbearing,
i.e. (e`   ea). On the other hand, the positive term Eu0 (p)   Eu0 (c) pushes
towards a negative  aimed at nancing the pension scheme. Hence, the sign of
the optimal child allowance depends on the strengths of those two terms.
In sum, once we reintroduce heterogeneity in terms of earnings prole, the
optimal family policy requires an arbitrage between equity and e¢ ciency. Given
that agents with lower future career opportunities tend to make children earlier,
the subsidization of fertility is supported by equity concerns. The cost gap
between late and early fertility tends to reinforce that equity case for children
allowances. However, a higher cost gap between late and early childbearing
pushes, from an e¢ ciency point of view, towards lower family allowances. As a
consequence, the observed falling cost gap between late and early childbearing
has a somewhat ambiguous e¤ect on the optimal family allowances.
6 Conclusion
As this is widely acknowledged among demographers, European economies have
been characterized, during the last three decades, by a tendency towards the
postponement of fertility. Through its consequences on the economy as a whole,
that demographic trend raises various challenges to policy-makers.
21
The present paper aimed at examining the design of the optimal family
policy in an economy where not only total fertility, but also the timing of births,
are chosen by individuals. For that purpose, we developed a simple three-period
model, where the adult population can have children either in young adulthood,
or in older adulthood, and where late childbearing, although possible, is more
costly than early childbearing. Moreover, the adult population was assumed
to be partitioned in two groups, some individuals having promising earnings
opportunities in the future (conditionally on the number of children at the
young age), whereas other individuals face a at earnings prole.
That simple model explains the observed postponement of fertility as a result
of the development of assisted reproductive technologies, which reduced the cost
gap between late and early childbearing. Our model allows us also to rationalize
the observed heterogeneity in terms of childbearing age, that is, the stylized fact
according to which adults with lower career opportunities tend to make children
earlier than adults with steeper earnings proles.
Regarding the optimal public intervention, we rstly considered the rst-
best utilitarian optimum, and showed that this can be decentralized by means
of lump-sum transfers from increasing-productivity agents towards constant-
productivity agents, in such a way as to equalize consumptions at all periods
for all agents. Such transfers were shown to raise constant-productivity indi-
vidualsearly fertility above its laissez-faire level, and to reduce the increasing-
productivity individualslate fertility, but without a¤ecting the timing of births
for the two types.
Then, considering an economy where only linear uniform policy instruments
are available, we showed that the optimal second-best policy involves a subsi-
dization of children, to the extent that it fosters early parenthood. Indeed, given
that early parenthood concerns generally parents with low career opportunities,
family allowances are justied on redistributive grounds. Children allowances
di¤erentiated according to the parents age, would, if available, achieve that
redistribution even better. Turning then to the optimal non-linear policy under
asymmetric information, we showed that only children from parents with at
earnings prole should be subsidized, to solve the self-selection problem.
Finally, we investigated the impact of di¤erential childbearing ages on the
funding of social security, by introducing, in our set-up, a pension system. At
the laissez-faire, one of the most striking e¤ects of endogenous childbearing ages
is that, under normal saving, or, alternatively, under a fully-funded pension sys-
tem, individuals tend to adopt late childbearing with more earnings, whereas,
under a PAYG system, there is a bias for early childbearing with overall lower
earnings. We also showed, in a framework without heterogeneity, that, under
a collective pension system, the fertility externalities related to early and late
parenthoods di¤er signicantly, inviting a larger Pigouvian subsidy for early
children. The underlying reason is both qualitative (older children, under in-
creasing productivity, can contribute more than younger, late children) and
quantitative (early parents can, once retired, benet from the contributions of
their grandchildren). Turning back to the 2-type case, we then highlighted that
the social planner faces, under endogenous childbearing age, a trade-o¤ between
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e¢ ciency (favoring late childbearing) and equity (helping early childbearing).
In sum, the present study, although it has no pretension to completeness,
highlights some major challenges faced by policy-makers in the context of en-
dogenous childbearing ages. Endogenous childbearing age a¤ects many funda-
mental aspects of the optimal policy design. As far as redistribution is con-
cerned, the observed correlation between the heterogeneity in terms of fertil-
ity age-pattern and in terms of career opportunities makes children allowances
di¤erentiated in terms of the age of parent socially desirable. Moreover, the
internalization of fertility externalities in the context of pensions funding would
also require children allowances di¤erentiated according to the age of parents.
Hence, even though policy debates are usually concerned with changes in the
total fertility rate, the timing of births is far from a detail for the design of the
optimal family policy, and, as such, will require more attention in the future.
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